Why do citizens get politically informed in a democracy? On one hand, being informed allows a citizen to participate in political discussions within her social network. On the other hand, having an informed opinion can help her to extend her social network. This paper builds a simple model on these insights and finds that effort in political information acquisition has inverted-U shape in the size of social network. The data from the
"Most people acquire political information so that they can participate in the conversation at parties, not in order to decide how to vote" (Tullock, 1967) Why do citizens get politically informed in a democracy? Understanding political information acquisition in large elections poses a challenge: if getting informed takes time and the instrumental payoffs are negligible (because the probability of being pivotal quickly goes to zero when the size of electorate increases), one cannot easily explain why so many citizens spend time getting informed. This is the well-known "rational ignorance" result first stated by Downs (1957) and Tullock (1967) in the decisiontheoretic framework (see Martinelli, 2006 for the statement of the result in the gametheoretic framework). Tullock summarizes this result as follows: "It would almost never be rational to engage in much study in order to cast a "well-informed" vote" (Tullock, 1967: 114) (however, the opening quote by Tullock shows that he was well aware of other potential avenues for understanding information acquisition). A simple look at the data shows that this model does not correspond to reality. The U.S. National Election Study (ANES) of 2000 shows that about 30% of respondents followed in full at least one TV debate between Gore and Bush. indicate that about one-sixth of respondents spend 30 minutes or more per day reading newspaper articles about politics. The instrumental-motivation rational choice models cannot explain these basic facts, and such failure calls for a better model of voters' motivation to acquire political information. 1 One strand of literature chooses to remain agnostic regarding voter motivation and tries instead to explain variation in political informedness by looking at the cost of information (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Stromberg, 2004, Prat and Stromberg, 2006; Larcinese, 2007) . However, understanding cost variation alone does not suffice to explain real-life patterns in political informedness of citizens. Boeri and Tabellini (2007) show, using data from an Italian survey, that voters' information matters for the viability of key welfare state reforms. Their findings suggest that informing citizens about the long-run payoffs from reforms might help to overcome broad opposition and create political support for reforming the welfare state. However, they find that better supply of information does not imply more information acquisition: citizens living in regions where media cover the reforms extensively are not informed better than those living in regions with less media coverage.
Everyday observation suggests that political campaign periods are also the periods of heated political discussions among citizens, and having an informed opinion serves as a "ticket" for entering into such discussions. Benz and Stutzer (2004) state that "in the weeks preceding the vote [at the Swiss referendum on joining the EU in 1992], it was almost impossible not to get involved in the fierce discussions on the subject, and consequently, the incentives to be informed were high". This intuition presents a promising alternative route to understanding information acquisition: citizens may spend time 1 Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) show that including ethical concerns in citizens' utility function theoreticallty substantially increases the fraction of citizens becoming informed, even when the cost of getting informed is positive. Measuring the extent to which ethical concerns drive information acquisition remains an open empirical question. acquiring political information to form opinions that serve them in discussions and social interactions with other fellow citizens. Ohr and Schrott (2001) , using the data from state-level elections in Germany, find that in deciding to get politically informed, citizens place most weight to the social expectations about them being informed.
These findings indicate that the role of social environment and social network of a citizen is fundamental for her political information acquisition. Enjoying participation in political debates with close friends should be a strong motivating force to get informed. Moreover, information serves not only for enjoying one's time within one's social network, but also plausibly to enlarge one's network. Becoming a friend with someone met at a dinner party is more likely if one can entertain an informed political discussion during the party, especially when important elections are forthcoming or some key political event has recently occurred. In other words, social capital, like any other form of capital, is an asset in the accumulation of which individuals invest rationally (as argued by Glaeser et al., 2002) , and political conversations may well serve this purpose. 2 This paper builds a simple model of political information acquisition inspired by these ideas. A citizen acquires political information that serves her to engage in political discussions within the existing social network, but also to make new friends. This combination of consumption and investment incentives implies -under standard concave technology assumptions -that the overall incentive to acquire information has an inverted-U-shaped relationship with the size of social network.
I confront this theoretical prediction with data from the 2000 ANES and the 2002-2006 ESS. I find that the effort to acquire political information, the level of political knowledge, and political interest and participation increase with the size of the social network, at a decreasing rate. The effect of social network is much weaker for the political efficacy measures for the United States, but not for Europe.
These findings open several interesting directions for future research. I discuss them in the concluding section of this paper.
MODEL
Consider a citizen living for two periods, t = 1, 2. In each period, she decides the effort that she puts into political information acquisition, e t . This effort translates into the amount of political information, q t :
Let's assume that this information is period-specific (e.g., it can be about the issues specific to elections in each period: the characteristics of candidates, their policy positions, etc.) and it does not accumulate across periods. Exerting effort implies a cost, c(e t ), with standard concavity assumptions: c > 0 and c > 0. 2 Skaperdas (2003) also studies a model built around the consumption motivation for political information acquisition. However, his paper gives no role for the investment motive and does not empirically test the model. The payoffs of political information are of two types: private and social exchange. Private payoffs, v(q t ), with v < 0 < v , are the payoffs that the citizen gets from making better private decisions using the acquired information. The social exchange payoffs come from using political information in debates with other citizens in one's social network. I denote the quantity of social exchange activity with s. The size of the citizen's social network is n. The social exchange is produced using a production function with political information and the size of social network as inputs: s = s(q(e), n).
(1)
The nature of these payoffs is clearly psychological and can be interpreted in terms of the expressive returns studied by Brennan and Lomasky (1993) for voting: a citizen enjoys utility from expressing her informed opinion, and the larger is the group to which she can express her opinion, the larger is her utility. Moreover, one's political information serves not only to enjoy utility from social exchange within the current network, but also to increment the social network for the next period. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) find that politically relevant social capital (i.e., the part of social capital that enhances participation) is built up in social networks as a by-product of information discussions. Let's assume then
where f (.) is a known function. The problem of the citizen is to maximize her lifetime payoff (net of effort costs) by choosing the effort levels devoted to political information acquisition: max e 1 ,e 2 v(q(e 1 )) + s(q(e 1 ), n 1 ) − c(e 1 ) + β[v(q(e 2 )) + s(q(e 2 ), n 2 ) − c(e 2 )],
subject to n 2 = f (n 1 , q(e 1 )).
Here, β denotes the intertemporal discount factor. When solving Problem (3) -(4), the citizen takes as given the initial social network size, n 1 .
The first-order conditions for e 1 and e 2 are:
The interpretation of these first-order conditions is as follows. Consider first Equation (5). It has four additive terms (three positive and one negative). The first term is the private marginal benefit. The second term is the first-period marginal social exchange benefit of effort to get informed. It is made of two parts: the second part describes how much the citizen's information increases as a result of incremental effort, which is then multiplied by the first part that describes how much one more unit of political information increases the social exchange activity of the citizen (at the given size of her social network). Let's call this term the consumption benefits of political information. The third term is the intertemporal marginal benefit of effort spent for political information acquisition. An additional unit of effort translates into more information dq de 1 , and each extra unit of information implies a larger social network of the citizen in the second period ∂f ∂q 1 n 1 . This, in turn, translates into higher social exchange in the second period, appropriately discounted. Let's call this term investment benefits of political information. Finally, the fourth term describes the marginal cost of effort. A rational citizen spends the first-period effort up to the point where total marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.
Next, consider Equation (6). Since there is no further accumulation of social network, this condition is made of only three terms: the private marginal benefit, the benefit from second-period social exchange, and the marginal cost of effort spent for political information acquisition in Period 2.
Consider again Equation (5). Let's apply the standard diminishing marginal returns assumption for consumption and investment benefits. Intuitively, it is likely that when the citizen's social network is small and increases marginally, the consumption benefits (which are initially low) increase rapidly. Subsequent expansion of social network will, however, bring in lower increments in consumption benefits. The opposite is true for investment benefits: when social network is relatively small, making new friends by investing into political information is relatively easy. However, as the social network size keeps expanding, making additional friends via such investment becomes relatively more difficult. These two mechanisms jointly imply that the overall incentive to acquire political information has an inverted-U-shaped relationship with the social network size.
To further elucidate these mechanisms, below I construct a simple theoretical example that illustrates this result.
A Simple Example
Let's suppose that the totality of social exchange of the citizen is composed of many individual interactions. In each individual interaction, the social exchange activity is produced using two inputs: the amount of political information that the citizen brings in (which I assume is simply equal to q) and the time spent in the individual interaction, τ. This single-interaction social exchange, which I denote with s, is produced using a production function of the Cobb-Douglas form:
with 0 < α < 1. In other words, time spent discussing with a partner and the political information brought in are (imperfectly) substitutable.
The citizen has total time resource for social exchange, T , that she divides equally between all n members of her social network. Thus, she enters into n interactions and spends T n of time in each interaction. Her overall social exchange production function (1) in a given period can now be written as
Note then that the marginal benefit (in terms of producing social exchange) of political information is increasing and concave in the network size, n:
given that n α is increasing and concave in n. Intuitively, the current-period (consumption) marginal benefits from political information acquisition are increasing and concave in the number of people with whom the citizen interacts. A larger social network has two effects, going in the opposite direction. On one hand, larger network implies more interactions. On the other hand, the citizen can devote less time to each interaction, and thus each interaction delivers lower payoffs. When n is low, an increase in network size brings in high incremental social activity: this is because the second effect is still very small (given that for low n, inside each individual interaction time is relatively abundant while information is relatively scarce). As n gets bigger, however, the second effect becomes more important (given that inside each individual interaction time now turns into the relatively scarce input). At the limit, when n is very high, the first and the second effects are of almost equal size and opposite signthus, the total effect is almost zero. In other words, for a very extensive social network, any further increase in the network size does not bring in any incremental consumption benefits from political information.
Let's now turn to the process of accumulation of social network. I assume that the pool of all agents with whom the citizen can interact is L and her potential acquaintances are all agents which are not in her current social network. The creation of new members of the social network is governed by a Cobb-Douglas production function, with political information (q) and the pool of potential acquaintances (L − n) as inputs. In other words, political information and the pool of potential partners are imperfectly substitutable for creating new acquaintances. When the pool of potential partners is large, one can make new friends even with a relatively low knowledge of politics; however, when the pool of potential acquaintances becomes smaller, to create the same number of new friends, one needs a deeper knowledge of politics (for instance, more arguments to discuss).
Furthermore, let's suppose that a share of acquaintances disappear between Periods 1 and 2 (for example, some citizens can move out, which can imply severing the links with them). Then, the evolution function for social capital of the citizen (4) can be written as:
Note that the investment benefits from political information acquisition are decreasing and concave in the size of the current social network:
The intuition for this is as follows. When the initial social network is small, the number of potential acquaintances is relatively abundant. In this case, a small increase in the social network size does not reduce much the marginal payoff (in terms of new friends) of investing into more political information. As the network size becomes bigger, any further increase makes the number of potential acquaintances scarcer (given the level of q). Thus, the negative effect of a larger network on the marginal payoff (in terms of new friends) of having more information gets bigger. At the limit, when the network size is very close to L, any further increase in the network size basically eliminates all the investment incentives to acquire political information.
Given the considerations above, now I can characterize the shape of the optimal firstperiod information acquisition. Consider again Equation (5). The marginal cost of effort is independent of the network size, and so is the marginal private benefit of effort. The benefit from social exchange, composed of the consumption and investment incentives to acquire political information, evolves non-monotonically in the initial network size. Given Equation (8), the consumption incentives to acquire political information are increasing and concave in n 1 . Given Equation (10), the investment incentives to acquire political information are decreasing and concave in n 1 . Then, given the concavity of both relations, the total incentives (i.e., the marginal benefit) to acquire information have an inverted-U-shape in the initial network size. Proposition 1 A citizen's effort to acquire political information is concave in the size of her social network.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In the rest of this paper, I verify whether this theoretical proposition is in line with individual-level data from the United States and Europe.
Let's assume that the benefit from information acquisition for a citizen i can be modeled as:
where X i is the vector of individual characteristics, M i is the size of i's social network, and ε i is the error term distributed normally with mean 0. All of the variables measuring political information acquisition in my empirical analysis are of ordered response type. This implies that one does not observe the latent variable
be unknown cut points, and define:
I can thus estimate the coefficients µ 0 and µ 1 using maximum-likelihood ordered probit procedure.
There are two potential problems with this specification. First, some third individuallevel political characteristic, such as intrinsic political motivation, may drive both the size of social network and the political information acquisition. For instance, politically motivated citizens may also be socially active, as well as acquire more political information, than less politically motivated citizens. To control for this problem, I add citizens' past political behavior (measured by having voted in the previous presidential elections) into the vector of controls X i .
Second and similarly, some third individual-level social-skill characteristic, such as intrinsic skills in accumulating social capital, may drive both the social network size and the political information acquisition. Citizens more skillful in building social capital may tend both to naturally have a larger social network and to acquire more political information. To account for this problem, I add individual social-activity characteristics (trust in other people, readiness to serve on jury, membership in an organization, and attendance of religious services) into the vector of controls X i .
DATA AND VARIABLES
The first source of data is the 2000 American National Election Study (ANES). It was conducted around the November 2000 presidential elections (a set of questions was asked before the elections, while the remaining part was asked after the elections). The sample contains 1,807 individuals; however, as most of my variables of interest were measured in the post-election part, my analysis mainly concentrates on a subsample of around 1,550 observations. The main reason for choosing this particular data set is that it contains explicit measures of an individual's political discussions within her social network. 3 The battery of dependent variables that I use can be classified into four categories: 1. Political information acquisition/seeking. These variables include: intensity of watching the presidential debates on TV between Gore and Bush, intensity of listening to radio programs about the campaign, and whether the respondent has seen any information about the campaign on the Internet; 2. Political interest/participation. These measures include: attention paid to presidential campaign news, attention paid to congressional campaign news, the degree to which the respondent follows government and public affairs, and turnout in 2000 elections; 3. Political knowledge. The measures in this category are: the knowledge score on party control (in the Senate and the House), public figure recognition score, the knowledge score on presidential and vice-presidential candidates (their state and religion), and the interviewer's evaluation of the respondent's political knowledge; and 4. Political efficacy. These variables include: feeling about having a good understanding of politics, feeling that the respondent's vote matters, feeling that public officials care what people think, and feeling that people have say about what government does. My main explanatory variable is constructed as follows. An interviewer asked each respondent whether the respondent has a person with whom she discusses politics. In case of an affirmative answer, the interviewer asked the respondent whether she has another discussant. This procedure was repeated twice more, which allows to measure the social network in which the individual discusses politics up to four people. I thus have constructed the index of size of political-discussion social network of a respondent, which varies from 0 to 4.
The size of social network is truncated at a relatively low value (many citizens might have more than four people with whom they discuss politics). Because of this shortcoming of the data, in most regressions I use the set of binary variables for each level of social network size (instead of using the continuous measure of network size and its square). This allows to see at which sample levels of network size the dependent variable measures reach their sample maxima.
The battery of control variables comprises individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, race, income, education, home-ownership, and length of residence in the community) and variables aimed at capturing unobservable political motivation and social-skill heterogeneity (turnout in the 1996 presidential elections, trust in other people, readiness to serve in a jury, membership in an organization, and the regular attendance of religious services). Table 1a presents the summary statistics for the key variables. On average, citizens report to have close to two people with whom they discuss politics regularly. However, there is a lot of heterogeneity: one-quarter of respondents do not discuss politics with anyone, and more than one-fifth discuss politics with (at least) four people. Similarly, on all measures of political information seeking, interest, knowledge, and efficacy, one can see that there is substantial variation in the data (standard deviations are relatively high).
To check whether my findings apply in a different context, I have chosen as the second source of data the 2002-2006 Cumulative European Social Survey (ESS). This biannual survey covers over 30 countries in Europe and includes a number of political information and interest variables. More importantly, it contains also a measure of individual social interactions, which I use as a proxy for the size of social network. Notably, the data set is much bigger than the ANES 2000 round: my typical regression for ESS is based on over 50,000 observations. 4 The battery of dependent variables in this data set belongs to three categories: 1. Political information acquisition/seeking. These variables include: intensity of watching TV news about politics and current affairs, intensity of listening to radio programs about politics, and intensity of reading newspaper articles about politics; 2. Political interest/participation. These measures include: how much the respondent is interested in politics and turnout in the latest national legislative elections; and 4
The overall sample is over 120,000 observations, but because of missing information on several control variables, my subsample reduces down to about 50,000 observations. 3. Political efficacy. These variables include: disagreeing that politics is too complicated to understand, the perception of difficulty of making up one's mind about political issues, trust in national parliament, general trust in politicians, trust in the European Parliament, and the degree of satisfaction with democracy in one's country. 5 My main explanatory variable in this data set is the frequency of socialization, measured on 0-6 scale. The value of 0 is given if the respondent states that she does not socialize at all, 1 if she socializes less than once a month, 2 if she socializes about once a month, etc. I also use, in robustness analysis, the variable that measures taking part in social activities as compared to others of the same age. This relative measure varies from 0 to 4, with 0 standing for taking part in social activities much less than most people of the same age, 1 -less than most, 2 -about the same, etc.
Both of these measures are imperfect: the relative distances between different values are not the same. Thus, in my regressions I employ the set of binary variables for each level of frequency of socialization (instead of using the continuous measure and its square).
The battery of control variables comprises individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, income categories), years of education completed, place of residence (city, suburb, town, village, or countryside), and variables aimed at capturing unobservable social-skill heterogeneity (trust in other people, membership in an organization, and the regular attendance of religious services). Given substantial variation in political systems across European countries, I also add country-level dummies in all the regressions run on the ESS data. Table 1b presents the summary statistics for the key variables in the ESS data set. On average, frequency of socialization is relatively high: the value of 3.96 is very close to the score of 4, which stands for socialization once a week. In fact, looking at the distribution across different categories, one can see that individuals that do not socialize or socialize less than once a month together comprise less than 10% of the sample, while those that socialize several times a week or every day comprise almost half of the sample. Similar to the 2000 ANES data set, there is substantial heterogeneity in all measures of political information acquisition, interest, and efficacy.
EVIDENCE

ANES 2000
If the data are in line with my theoretical model, one should see that the size of social network has an increasing and concave relationship with measures of political information acquisition, knowledge, and interest. Before running the full-fledged econometric analysis, though, let's look at the simple correlations between size of social network and political information acquisition. 5 The ESS does not contain measures of political knowledge of the respondent. Figure 1 plots the means of three political information acquisition variables (intensity of watching TV debates between Gore and Bush, public figure recognition score, and attention paid to 2000 presidential campaign news), for each level of social network size. The pattern is clear: for all the three variables, citizens with larger network size tend to report higher values of political information acquisition. The concavity of the relationship is less clear. This might be because the measure of network size is truncated at a relatively low value, or because the investment incentives described in my theoretical model are empirically less important.
The graphical evidence, while suggestive, cannot be considered as conclusive, because it does not allow to control for numerous individual characteristics that might be driving both the social network size and political information acquisition. Let's then proceed to the econometric analysis, which permits to control for these characteristics and thus to separate the effect of network size. Table 2 shows my regression results with measures of political information acquisition as dependent variables. 6 Even after controlling for a large battery of individual characteristics, I find that the citizens with a larger social network size are more likely to declare higher intensity of watching presidential TV debates, more frequent listening to radio programs about the campaign, and more intensive search for information about the campaign on the Internet. The regression coefficients on network-size dummies (the omitted category is "Discuss politics with 4 people") are negative and highly statistically significant and the absolute value of the 6 In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variables are ordered response, thus I use ordered probit, whereas in Column 3, the dependent variable is binary, thus I use simple probit regression. I report the standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. coefficient is monotonically declining in network size, almost everywhere. Moreover, there is (a somewhat weaker) evidence that the strength of the effect of a larger social network decreases with its size: the differences in the absolute values of coefficients on the network-size dummies tend to decrease with the size of network, which indicates a concave relationship. Statistically, for all the three regressions, the equality-of-coefficient tests (not reported here, available upon request from the author) reject the equality of coefficients for the first two categories ("No one with whom discuss politics" and "Discuss politics with 1 person") and cannot reject the equality of coefficients of the subsequent pairs of categories. Note that these results indirectly disconfirm the findings of the line of research that argues that social embeddedness helps to get political information for free or at a very low cost (Campbell et al., 1960; Fiorina, 1981; Huckfeldt, 1983 Huckfeldt, , 2001 Zaller, 1989; McClurg, 2003 McClurg, , 2006 . The predictions of those models are difficult to reconcile with the evidence that citizens with a larger social network tend to actively invest more in political information acquisition.
These results confirm my theoretical model. However, there are several potential caveats that have to be addressed. First, the findings might be driven by the particularities of the U.S. presidential elections; it might be interesting to see whether the results are robust when one looks at other elections. Second, since political information is not restricted to elections, one may wonder about the relevance of my theoretical model to political-information behavior of citizens beyond the elections. Third, given the wellestablished link between political informedness and participation, it is interesting to check whether this social exchange motivation has any relevance for turnout. Fourth, the self-reported measures of information acquisition might be unreliable: if a respondent feels any negative connotation of not being politically informed, she might over-report the extent to which she invests into getting informed. 7 Moreover, this over-reporting might be related to social network size, because respondents with a larger social network might feel the negative connotation stronger than those with a smaller network. It is then necessary to check whether the model explains not only the variation in selfreported information acquisition, but also the variation in objective measures of political knowledge.
To address these concerns, I repeat my analysis using several alternative measures of political information acquisition, and find that my basic findings are robust. Tables 3a and 3b report the regression results with political interest/participation and political knowledge measures as dependent variables. 8 7 Burden (2000) discusses in detail the problem of over-reporting of turnout in NES data. Even though my analysis mainly concerns political information, the underlying causes of over-reporting might be similar. 8 To economize on space, Tables 3a-3c do not report the coefficients on control variables (I use the same individual controls as in the regressions of Table 2 ). In Table 3a , for Columns 1-3 ordered probit is used. In Column 4, the dependent variable is binary, thus I use simple probit. In Table 3b , for Columns 1-4 ordered probit is used. Column 5 is a robustness check and reports the results of a simple OLS regression. In Table 3c , I use ordered probit in all the regressions. In Table 3a , the dependent variables are measures of political interest and participation. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variables are the attention paid to presidential and to congressional campaign news, respectively. Comparing the results of these two regressions allows me to check whether the findings are driven by the peculiarity of the presidential elections. In Column 3, the dependent variable is the extent to which the respondent follows government and public affairs. This measure has the advantage of not being directly related to elections and campaigns, and thus this regression checks the relevance of my model to citizens' political-information behavior beyond the elections. In Column 4, the dependent variable is turnout at the 2000 elections. This regression checks whether political discussions in social networks have consequences on participatory behavior of citizens.
In Table 3b , I employ four different objective measures of citizens' political knowledge: the score on the knowledge about which party controls the Senate and the House, the score on recognizing several key public figures, the score on the knowledge about presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and the interviewer's evaluation of the respondents' political knowledge. These regressions allow me to address the concern about the possible over-reporting by citizens of their political information acquisition efforts.
Looking at the regression results, one sees that except for two coefficients -on "Discuss politics with 1 person" in Column 2 of Table 3a , and on "Discuss politics with 2 people" in Column 1 of Table 3b , the findings are strikingly similar to those Ordered probit Ordered probit Ordered probit Ordered probit procedure Note: Benchmark category for network size is "Discuss politics with 4 people".
reported above: the regression coefficients on network-size dummies are negative, highly statistically significant in most cases, are monotonically decreasing in absolute value, and the differences in absolute size get smaller as the network size increases. These findings strengthen the evidence in favor of my theoretical model.
A further interesting question is what effect the network size has on the citizens' perception of political efficacy. To answer this question, I repeat my econometric analysis with four measures of political efficacy as dependent variables: the extent to which the respondent agrees with the statements "I feel that I have a good understanding of politics", "I feel that my vote matters", "I feel that public officials care about what people think", and "I feel that people have a say about what government does". Table 3c reports the findings of these regressions. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the extent to which the respondent feels to have a good understanding of politics. The results resemble those found in earlier regressions: citizens with a larger social network tend to feel that they have a better understanding of politics than those with a smaller network. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the extent to which the respondent feels that her vote matters. Here, the results are strikingly different from those above: all the regression coefficients on network-size dummies are positive, the first three coefficients are highly statistically significant, and there is a negative monotonic relationship between network size and feeling that the respondent's vote matters. In other words, citizens that discuss politics with more people tend to be more pessimistic about the political importance of their individual votes. This might be because of the unique feature of the Reading politics in newspapers Interest in politics Disagree that politics is too complicated to understand 2000 presidential election, in that no president-elect was nominated immediately after the elections because of vote re-counting problems. On the other hand, the results in Columns 3 and 4 indicate that there is no robust statistical relationship between network size and the feeling that public officials care about what people think or the feeling that people have a say in what government does. Thus, the pessimistic feelings of citizens with larger political-discussion networks concern only votes and elections, and not the political accountability in general. Jointly, these findings suggest that better political informedness of citizens related to larger social networks might imply a weaker feeling of personal political efficacy, if -as a consequence of being better informed -citizens become aware of problems in the functioning of their democratic system.
ESS 2002-2006
To test my theoretical model in a different context, I use the data from the 2002-2006 Cumulative European Social Survey (ESS). Given that the data set does not contain measures of social network size, I use as the main explanatory variable the frequency of socialization. In other words, I have to adopt an implicit assumption that larger social network size is correlated with higher frequency of socialization. Even though this assumption may not apply always (for instance, some citizens with a small network might interact frequently within their network), it is likely to apply for the majority of citizens. Figure 2 plots the means of three political information acquisition variables, by frequency of socialization. There is a clear inverted-U-shaped pattern for all the three variables: citizens with intermediate frequency of socialization read more about politics in newspapers, declare a stronger interest in politics, and are more likely to disagree that politics is too difficult to understand, than citizens with very low or very high frequency of socialization.
Turning now to the econometric analysis, Table 4 shows my regression results with political information acquisition measures as dependent variables. 9 In Columns 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variables are, respectively, the intensity of political information acquisition on TV, radio, and newspapers. In all the three specifications, there is a concave relationship between the frequency of socialization and information acquisition. In other words, citizens that socialize more frequently exert higher effort to get informed via TV, radio, and newspapers, but the incremental effort gets smaller (and beyond some point turns negative) as the frequency of socialization increases. Table 5a presents regression results with political interest and participation as dependent variables. 10 In Column 1, the dependent variable is the interest in politics, whereas in Column 2, the dependent variable is turnout in the latest national legislative elections. In both specifications the dependent variable has a clear concave relationship with the frequency of socialization. Citizens that socialize more often declare to be more interested in politics and are more likely to vote. However, the incremental effect gets ever weaker as the frequency of socialization increases. Table 5b presents regression results with measures of political efficacy as dependent variables. Contrarily to the results found for the United States in 2000, in all the specifications, the concave relationship between political efficacy and frequency of socialization is still present. There are three possible explanations for this difference in results. First, the explanatory variable is not exactly the same across two sets of regressions. In other words, one might have found results similar to those for the United States, if one were to use the size of political-discussion network as the main explanatory variable for the ESS regressions. Second, the dependent variables are not exactly the same across two sets of regressions. For instance, the ESS does not have a measure whether the respondent feels that her vote matters. It is possible that if I were to use this measure for the ESS regression, I could have found the pattern similar to the one in the United States. Finally, the relationship between political efficacy and social network size might be inherently different in the United States and in Europe. For example, Europeans with relatively larger social networks might be more satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their countries (as a consequence of being more informed about politics), while their American counterparts might be satisfied less, perhaps because of the particular outcome of the 2000 presidential elections. Understanding which of these different possibilities explains the pattern that we find in the data is an interesting question that we leave for future work.
For both the ANES and the ESS data, I perform further robustness checks. 11 For the ANES data, first, given that political culture might vary across the U.S. states, I 9 In all specifications (except Column 2 in Table 5a ) I use ordered probit. Column 2 in Table 5a reports the results where the dependent variable is binary, thus I use simple probit. 10 To economize on space, Tables 5a and 5b do not report the coefficients on control variables (I use the same individual controls as in the regressions of Table 4 ). 11 I do not report regression tables here, but they are available upon request. repeat the regressions adding state dummies, and find that the effect of social network size is very similar to that found in the regressions without state dummies. Second, the battery of individual controls might be still insufficient to claim that the variation in the size of social network is exogenous. To address this endogeneity problem, I repeat the regressions with the length of residence (and its square) as the main explanatory variable. 12 It is likely that the reasons for residential mobility are not directly related to political information acquisition behavior. If so, I can consider the variation in the length of residence as exogenous. The results of these regressions are similar to those with network size as the main explanatory variable: political information acquisition has a highly statistically significant inverted-U-shaped relationship with the length of residence.
For the ESS data, I perform a robustness analysis using as the main explanatory variable the relative frequency of socialization (as compared to others of the same age), instead of the absolute frequency of socialization. I still find the concave relationship between the relative frequency of socialization and political information acquisition. 
CONCLUSION
If citizens are influenced by their social environment and benefit from their social network, getting politically informed gives two kinds of social payoffs. On one hand, being informed allows the citizen to participate in political debates within her network and enjoy the utility of sharing her informed opinion with her friends. On the other hand, being able to entertain an informed discussion about political topics may allow her to make new friends and extend her social network. This paper formalizes these mechanisms in a simple model and shows that the data from the 2000 American National Election Study and the 2002-2006 European Social Surveys are in line with the model's predictions.
I acknowledge that my model has some limitations. Most importantly, the theoretical model is built in a decision-theoretic framework: the citizen does not take into account the behavior of her potential discussion partners. In reality, there are many potential topics of discussion (within and beyond politics) and being informed on one topic while others are uninformed about it probably does not pay off. This implies that citizens coordinate on most salient topics (some of which during the campaign period are inevitably related to the elections). This model says nothing about how citizens decide in this framework and how such coordination occurs. It is likely that mass media play a key role in coordinating citizens' information acquisition patterns, and investigating this idea (maintaining the motivational foundations of the model) seems to be a fruitful direction for further research.
Two other extensions seem natural for this work. First, given that political informedness is one of the determinants of voter turnout, one can build a model of voter participation based on informational mechanisms described in this paper. In such a model, a citizen's decision to vote would be based in part on her political informedness, which is, in turn, linked to her social incentives to acquire information. Second, the model can be extended to analyze the effects of introducing a new medium on voter information and turnout. While a new medium generally implies lower costs of acquiring political information, it may also affect the demand side of information. The existing literature finds contrasting results: Stromberg (2004) shows that the introduction of radio had increased turnout, while Gentzkow (2006) finds that the expansion of television had a negative effect on turnout. This paradox can be explained in the context of my model: television is known to destroy social capital (Putnam, 2000; Olken, 2006) , and thus the effect of TV on the demand side of information (both lower consumption and investment incentives to acquire information) is perhaps stronger than the effect on the supply side. Conversely, radio is unlikely to have had a strong negative effect on social capital, and this explains the positive effect of radio on turnout. In today's era of Internet, a question naturally arises: was the effect of the massive expansion of Internet on the information demand side (i.e., the negative effect) stronger than the one on the supply side (i.e., the positive effect)? An extended model based on the one presented in this paper and an empirical test should be able to provide an answer to this fascinating question.
